Friday, August 31, 2007

Just the Numbers: Week 35

THE NUMBERS

Clinton continues to move up in Iowa estimates and in the national ranks. Obama moving up in VP ranks.

Despite strong Iowa, Edwards contract now about even with Al Gore, who isn't even running ...

Very little change among the GOP nominee contenders. Brownback trades to zero (even Hegel, who isn't running, has a higher bid). McCain's recovery momentum stalls. (It's doubtful that the strong falloff in Thompson's primary figures amounts to more than a data error. If not, he's running on fumes ...).

THE STRATEGIES

Here's an very interesting and quite possibly very profitable set of payoffs.

Suppose you are (a) pretty sure that it will be one of the frontrunners but (b) not sure which. Pretty sure that Thompson won't be in the final round, but not willing to bet the farm on it.

Using a combination of the parley contracts and the straight-up Thompson contract, you can get up to an expected return of 28% (before trading costs and the horrible bid-ask in the parleys...).

Payoff any combo of Clinton, Obama, Giuliani, Romney 46.9%
Hedged Payoff, Thompson Loses 25.7%
Hedged Payoff, Thompson Wins 31.9%
Expected Gain 28.8%

To execute this, one would buy the four parley contracts, Clinton-Giuliani, Clinton-Romeny, Obama-Giuiliani, Obama-Romney. IF one of the combos "wins", the others all lose by definition, for an expected result of 46.9% (if any one of the non-frontrunners wins, then all the money is gone ... so, don't pretend to yourself that this stuff isn't speculative).

To hedge against the win of Thompson, the most-likely non-frontrunner at this point, you could buy the Thompson contract outright. If he ends up in the final parleys, you might profit 31.9%. If he does drop out, then buying this "insurance" only trims your result to 25.7%.

Considering that the parleys might be known by February of next year, that's not bad for a six month investment!

Update:

I ran the numbers on the "ask" side of the market for the parleys, which looks particularly 'bad', because it is far more expensive, not just slightly more expensive (although I think that intrade has a mechanism where you can try to get the price you want). Anyway, using the published figures the numbers do change substantially because of the "bid-ask" spreads:

Payoff any combo of Clinton, Obama, Guiliani, Romney 29.4
Hedged Payoff, Thompson Loses 6.9
Hedged Payoff, Thompson Wins 48.1
Expected Gain 27.5



Next PresidentPr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
CLINTON(H)41.23.21%
GIULIANI19.51.41%
OBAMA10-3.98%
ROMNEY8.6-0.69%
THOMPSON(F)8.6-0.56%
GORE3.8-137%
EDWARDS3.1-0.723%
2007 Week 35: Dems in Iowa with Lance Armstrong (Clinton announces new 'War on Cancer'); blogger Lane Hudson files against Thompson's entry dance; and Thompson will, at long last, announce. Rudy takes swipes at his 9/11 management with statistic about Yankees games; Romney releases jogging ad that causes a stir.
GOP NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
GIULIANI38.72.51%
ROMNEY23.50.10%
THOMPSON(F)21.2-16%
MCCAIN5-1.12%
HUCKABEE3.50.53%
PAUL4.10.35%
GINGRICH3.303%
DEM NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
CLINTON67.95.20%
OBAMA16.9-3.22%
EDWARDS7.1-0.34%
GORE7.1-1.410%
RICHRDSN1.1-0.7n.m.
BIDEN0.40.2n.m.
DODD0.10n.m.
SenatePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
DEM80.55.45%
GOP15031%
Next ExecutivePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
DEM58.11.51%
GOP39.80.20%
OTH2-1.715%
DEM VP NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
OBAMA25318%
RICHARDSON18-1244%
CLARK102.430%
WARNER10085%
WEBB7736%
BAYH6.5-3109%
GORE4.40.49%
src: intrade.com; bid-ask are not points, but spread as a percentage of the bid. Polls comparison, via RealClearPolitics.
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: this is just an informational note and not a solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell securities and there is no guarantee implied and people can lose all money on all investments. Numbers are believed to be correct, but do your own math and make your own conclusions or consult with an advisor before making any decisions.
Caucus/CandidatePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
Iowa Caucus
Democratic
CLINTON50550%
OBAMA17718%
EDWARDS27285%
FIELD0.1-0.2n.m.
GORE0.10n.m.
Republican
ROMNEY50580%
GIULIANI100100%
THOMPSON(F)5-20600%
FIELD60150%
MCCAIN10n.m.
New Hampshire Primary
Democratic
CLINTON65015%
OBAMA15067%
EDWARDS50200%
FIELD0.20n.m.
GORE1.40n.m.
Republican
ROMNEY505n.m.
GIULIANI20050%
THOMPSON(F)0-15n.m.
FIELD60150%
MCCAIN10n.m.
South Carolina Primary
Democratic
CLINTON5559%
OBAMA25040%
EDWARDS100100%
FIELD00n.m.
GORE1.50n.m.
Republican
ROMNEY50200%
GIULIANI30033%
THOMPSON(F)11-39445%
FIELD00n.m.
MCCAIN0.10n.m.
Florida Primary
Democratic
CLINTON8000%
OBAMA10-0.10%
EDWARDS000%
FIELD000%
GORE000%
Republican
ROMNEY0.100%
GIULIANI60100%
THOMPSON(F)5-250%
FIELD500%
MCCAIN0.800%
Nevada Primary
Democratic
CLINTON7550%
OBAMA1500%
EDWARDS000%
FIELD000%
GORE0.100%
Republican
ROMNEY1500%
GIULIANI3000%
THOMPSON(F)0-400%
MCCAIN000%

The Fed, The Fed, The Fed ...

Today's Bernanke speech on the housing market.

Meanwhile, the Fed couldn't have gotten a better set of economic numbers this morning, eh? Growth is solid and inflation is under control. Rock 'n Roll.



The Gory Details

The big banks need to be pushed to use their reserves. Also, they should cut the Prime rate, now. To wit:

Diminished demand for loans and bonds to finance highly leveraged transactions has increased some banks' concerns that they may have to bring significant quantities of these instruments onto their balance sheets. These banks, as well as those that have committed to serve as back-up facilities to commercial paper programs, have become more protective of their liquidity and balance-sheet capacity.
The evil side of technological change - too much shorthand? On the other hand, face-to-face lending, in the USA, has a nasty way of getting discriminatory in the wrong ways ...

In some ways, the new mortgage market came to look more like a textbook financial market, with fewer institutional "frictions" to impede trading and pricing of event-contingent securities. Securitization and the development of deep and liquid derivatives markets eased the spreading and trading of risk. New types of mortgage products were created. Recent developments notwithstanding, mortgages became more liquid instruments, for both lenders and borrowers. Technological advances facilitated these changes; for example, computerization and innovations such as credit scores reduced the costs of making loans and led to a "commoditization" of mortgages. Access to mortgage credit also widened; notably, loans to subprime borrowers accounted for about 13 percent of outstanding mortgages in 2006.
Who will bear the costs of transition away from mistakes? It depends on how big they are, basically. If they derail the economy, yes; otherwise, no. That's a knife's edge to walk in a fully data-dependent way. [One has to laugh at "investors providing oversight", however ...]

I have argued elsewhere that, in some cases, the failure of investors to provide adequate oversight of originators and to ensure that originators' incentives were properly aligned was a major cause of the problems that we see today in the subprime mortgage market (Bernanke, 2007). In recent months we have seen a reassessment of the problems of maintaining adequate monitoring and incentives in the lending process, with investors insisting on tighter underwriting standards and some large lenders pulling back from the use of brokers and other agents. We will not return to the days in which all mortgage lending was portfolio lending, but clearly the originate-to-distribute model will be modified--is already being modified--to provide stronger protection for investors and better incentives for originators to underwrite prudently.
A general truth that didn't work out in this particular bust. As we've discovered, a number of lenders have been caught with far too many short-term liabilities on their balance sheet. It is true, however, that it appears that fees and penalties have played a significant role, rather than rate levels, just as they did during the junk-bond, S&L boom-bust of the early 1990s.

In particular, in the absence of Reg Q ceilings on deposit rates and with a much-reduced role for deposits as a source of housing finance, the availability of mortgage credit today is generally less dependent on conditions in short-term money markets, where the central bank operates most directly.

The Wasteful Side of Free-Market Competition

Every now and then you come across a piece of financial writing that is gleefully unaware of the case that they are making - a seemingly game-theoretic model in which competition incents excess:

The combination of 'teaser' interest rates on adjustable rate mortgages and institutional money flowing into the mortgage market seeking higher returns resulted in intense competition in the subprime mortgage origination market. The reason vintage years 2005 and 2006 are looked at with more scrutiny is because increased competition in the subprime mortgage arena led to relaxed underwriting standards.
All the more reason why "free markets" is just a important rally point, but not a serious going analytical effort (or all that is required).

Oh, and just to be complete, here is something from today's speech by Bernanke that indicates how important it is to design the right kind of curbs:

The original rationale for deposit ceilings [rate regulation under reg-Q] was to reduce "excessive" competition for bank deposits, which some blamed as a cause of bank failures in the early 1930s. In retrospect, of course, this was a dubious bit of economic analysis. In any case, the principal effects of the ceilings were not on bank competition but on the supply of credit.
From which we can go the last step, beyond designing the right kinds of curbs, to the apt removal of curbs that outlive their usefulness. To wit, it was the relaxation of reg-Q that eventually created the enormously taxpayer-costly S&L thrift crisis ...

Recession Fears? "Emergency" cut in Prime Rate, before Fed Meets

MORE evidence in support of the idea that it would be a really, really good time to cut the prime rate, which is used in some cases for investor financing ... The Prime also drives some home equity loan financing ... The Prime drives a considerable amount of consumer revolving debt, too.

Investment homes are major part of defaults



So many of the hired economists are worried about recession, not even slowdown, now.

Even the "mainstream media" haven't considered that, if so many economists and advisers are worried about a US recession, they might show leadership by cutting the Prime rate:

First Cut on GOP's Housing Proposals - Not On the Mark, Not Far Enough

The first cut of the expected Bush-GOP speech on home lending reform today is that it appears to leave out at least one key aspect of improving 'the system'.

RUN-OF-THE MILL PROPOSALS MISS OPPORTUNITIES

The Ogre of Bankruptcy

It goes back to the GOP's bankruptcy reform, which tried to address issues with abuse of bankruptcy, but may have created as many problems as it sought to solve. Some of the problems, however, are much older, see Bankruptcy Laws Contributing to Foreclosure Epidemic:

The amendment [to existing bankruptcy laws] disfavoring protection of the debtor's principal residence was added at a time -- 1978 -- when home mortgages were nearly all fixed-interest rate instruments with low loan-to-value ratios and were rarely themselves the source of a family's financial distress. As a result, bankruptcy law singled out the home mortgage loan as the major debt for which the bankruptcy court is powerless to provide relief, they said.

Crisis ?= Opportunity for Needed Structural Reform


So far, no indications that the GOP's bill-of-fare attempts to stimulate the housing market by proposing actions that will increase the amount of decent, affordable housing, rather than just offering insurance subsidies for ever larger and more expensive homes, that are beyond the reach of a great many who could really benefit net national savings in the long run by purchasing a 'starter home'.

REFORMING THE FEDERAL HOUSING INSURANCE

Reforming the FHA has been on the legislative table from earlier this year and is not new (see S.1805, and H.R. 110-217. I don't know why there are two versions in the house.
H.R.1752 and H.R. 1852).

Senator Schumer's bill creates something called a 'high-cost area', which would bring FHA money, possibly, into New York. The worth of that creation seems debatable.

The other changes - from a brief look - appear to center on accepting less cash down in favor of a higher initial insurance premium to the FHA, raising the limits on borrowing, and extending the terms of loans out to ... 40 years. (40 yrs is a slight 'improvement', maybe 7% increase in payment affordability, buttressed by a longer expected working lifespan).

"Limits" ought to be formulaic, based on the ratios of some variables and so forth. Putting discretion on limits into the hands of a non-economic model is ... politically inadvisable.

Writing more insurance during a crisis seems like a stupid idea on face value, but one hope is that more FHA insurance could help some people off of crazy-bad private loans and onto something more stable.

I don't think that charging more insurance for an ARM is the way to go, frankly. A better model would be to require higher income-to-payment ratio from the borrower, i.e. more capacity to bear the risk of an ARM, rather than that they pay a premium to mitigate a mis-estimate of the same during ... what else, foreclosure (ug!).

REFORMING THE TAX CODE

This is a good idea. It may well help with loan work-outs and even foreclosures. However, care must be taken (obviously) not to create a loophole for professional real-estate investors to increase their speculation(s) and for wealthy people to overpay now so that they can get a tax-shelter later.

Personally, I don't think it would be easy to write this kind of legislation. It might take a fairly long while to get all the angles down pat so that it was 'good legislation' out the door.

Thursday, August 30, 2007

Stochastics for Millionaires

From Brad DeLong's blog, I find out that Emanuel Derman has a website, on which he asks a question (back in April):

A student today asked me how one would explain stochastic calculus to someone who knew no math.
Apparently his readers or grad students have no sense of folly and fun. To wit:

The Stochastic Calculus is:

  • The numerology of futurology.
  • Integrating over the uncertain and inaccurate in order to generate estimates of the improbable.
As for the vol-of-vol, no one has yet improved on the phrase, "picking up pennies in front of a steam roller".

America's Crumbling Infrastructure

It reads like 1990 all over again, yes?

The American Society of Civil Engineers in a 2005 report, however, said it will cost more than $9 billion a year for 20 years to eliminate all bridge deficiencies.

The total tab to lift all the nation's infrastructure to good condition is estimated at $1.6 trillion over five years.

The report gave a "C" to the bridges, while the the power grid, dams, roads, water systems and school buildings each got a "D" and infrastructure security an "incomplete."
On a personal note, I got laughed at when I suggested, post 9/11, that it was an opportunistic time to expand the number, capacity, and quality of US airports. (There was much debate about the measure of an economic stimulus package at that time that, as we know now, ended in dubious marginal income tax rate cuts ...).

With over half - half! - of all flights late this summer, that looks like a good idea, even with all the new security that was supposed to deter travel ...

Friday, August 24, 2007

Tuesday, August 21, 2007

Housing Bubble Riddle

Here are two charts that might scared your socks off, from the Wikipedia page on "housing bubble", which has grown a half page a day this week, almost:



Here is another, through May, showing that housing prices peaked last year.


Has economic growth supported the rise in home prices?

These tables show a short answer to that, in three parts: economic growth (increases in what people have to spend on housing in total), changes in financial market variables (nominal mortgage rates), and the growth in the total number of housing units (households proxy).

The rise in prices appears generally to be supported - the over / under is in a general range of +/- 20%. I'd be alarmed if the range was upwards of 50%.

Of course, the analysis is sensitive to the housing price index used. I've just taken one broad and good survey, that uses the median (the average might be quite a lot higher). Notice that this measure doesn't nearly double like the one in the chart above, starting from around 2000.

YearGDP ($MM)
PCE
($MM)
Avg Contr Mtg Ratememo: Spread to 10-yrImplied Value of Housing Stock ($MM)
19874739.53100.29.192.015,195
19885103.83353.68.920.665,790
19895484.43598.59.310.305,952
19905803.13839.99.681.256,109
19915995.93986.19.541.516,435
19926337.74235.38.020.718,133
19936657.44477.97.491.19,207
19947072.24743.36.731.0910,854
19957397.74975.87.770.189,862
19967816.95256.87.181.611,275
19978304.35547.47.551.0511,315
199887475879.57.121.6112,717
19999268.46282.56.772.1214,291
200098176739.47.791.1213,323
20011012870557.252.0714,986
200210469.67350.76.811.7816,623
200310960.87703.65.911.9420,074
200411685.98195.95.631.4922,419
200512433.98707.85.721.5923,444
200613194.79224.56.31.7722,549
2007
9769.86.371.5423,619
2008
10062.96.83222,689


YearNumber of Housing Units (M)Implied Value per unitMedian Asking Sales PriceMedian -/+ Imp Value
1987101,81151,027
%
1988103,65355,85859,2006%
1989105,72956,29954,200-4%
1990106,28357,47862,7009%
1991107,27659,98263,7006%
1992108,31675,08273,300-2%
1993109,61183,99669,600-17%
1994110,95297,82572,200-26%
1995112,65587,54177,500-11%
1996114,13998,78381,200-18%
1997115,62197,86587,700-10%
1998117,282108,43087,800-19%
1999119,044120,04989,400-26%
2000119,628111,37190,400-19%
2001121,480123,36093,300-24%
2002119,297139,339111,100-20%
2003120,834166,126117,100-30%
2004122,187183,478122,100-33%
2005123,925189,180140,100-26%
2006126,012178,942168,800-6%
2007127,438185,340168,800-9%
2008128,438176,657168,800-4%


Source: National Average Contract Mortgage Rate, Federal Housing Finance Board's Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS); BEA; Bureau of the Census; constant proportion equal to 15% of PCE assumed spent on housing; 2007/8 estimates thought to be conservative.
Important Note: This is just a back-of-the-envelop look. Houses, of course, as wasting assets, so some annual measure of depreciation might be added, although this might be small given a useful life of a home of 50 years. "Housing units" are not standardized, so simply adding new to old without adjustment is a slight of hand. Also, the size and quality of land associated with homes is clearly very important.

Marshall Plan Cost Far Less than OIF

Update & Correction:

*sigh* I grabbed NIPA table 1.1.6 instead of 1.1.5 for the historical calculations, which affects only the percentages to GDP.

The revisions are as follows:

4.94% of 1948 GDP or about 0.95% over the five-year life of the Marshall Plan. (I'm using 1948, not 1947, consistent with this article, I hope. Folks used GNP, then, until the main National Accounts presentation switched in 199?)

The total cost ratio remains unchanged at 7.4x, comparing the costs in current dollars, $98B for Marshall plan and circa $705B for "current costs" of military activities of the Bush-era "GWOT".

The comparative ratio goes down significantly, to 1.4x, however, comparing the 0.95% of GDP figure to about 1.5% for the current Bush-era "GWOT".

Of course, if one includes some of the other costs of the GWOT, ...



Cost of Marshall Plan in 1948, $13.3 billion, or 0.81% of 1948 GDP and 0.16% of all GDP over the five-year life of the program.

Cost of Marshall Plan in 2007 Dollars, $98.7 billion (using GDP deflater), about 7.4x more costly.

"Current Costs" only of military actions to-date, $705 Billion, or about 1.5% of all GDP since the start of OIF in March, 2003, which is 9.3x more costly.

Saturday, August 18, 2007

Just the Numbers: Week 33

THE NUMBERS

Thompson's numbers skidded and did not recover after the Ames straw poll in Iowa. Romney and Huckabee both get a bump, but McCain does not - this is important, perhaps, for those thinking that Thompson may drop out. Giuliani continues front runner status.

Clinton appears to have pulled ahead in Iowa and this has pushed her decisively ahead in general, too, even where she had shown weakness against Giuliani in the past.

THE STRATEGIES

Gore has moved up to over 8.5% ahead of Edwards in the Dem nominee tables. Because it is highly improbable that Gore will campaign for the Presidency again, this seems like an opportunity to sell.


Next PresidentPr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
CLINTON(H)387.72%
GIULIANI18.1-1.911%
OBAMA13.9-5.64%
ROMNEY9.22.27%
THOMPSON(F)9.1-1.931%
GORE4.80.513%
EDWARDS3.8-0.353%
2007 Week 33: Ames staw poll in Iowa moves the numbers away from Thompson and gives Huckabee a bump; Quinnipiac College poll shows Clinton moves ahead in a few swing states, after trailing.
GOP NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
GIULIANI36.20.82%
THOMPSON(F)22.2-9.33%
ROMNEY23.44.60%
MCCAIN6.10.17%
PAUL3.80.618%
GINGRICH3.30.218%
HUCKABEE32.327%
DEM NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
CLINTON62.712.40%
OBAMA20.1-13.312%
GORE8.53.11%
EDWARDS7.40.41%
RICHRDSN1.8-1.1n.m.
BIDEN0.2-0.9n.m.
DODD0.10n.m.
SenatePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
DEM75.109%
GOP15067%
Next ExecutivePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
DEM56.60.20%
GOP39.60.10%
OTH3.7-0.58%
DEM VP NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
RICHARDSON30315%
OBAMA221.835%
WARNER10085%
BAYH9.5016%
CLARK7.6071%
CLINTON(H)7036%
EDWARDS6158%
src: intrade.com; bid-ask are not points, but spread as a percentage of the bid. Polls comparison, via RealClearPolitics.
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: this is just an informational note and not a solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell securities and there is no guarantee implied and people can lose all money on all investments. Numbers are believed to be correct, but do your own math and make your own conclusions or consult with an advisor before making any decisions.

Caucus/CandidatePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
Iowa Caucus
Democratic
CLINTON451010%
OBAMA10-10100%
EDWARDS25240%
FIELD0.30n.m.
GORE0.1-4.9n.m.
Republican
ROMNEY45422%
GIULIANI10-5100%
THOMPSON(F)25040%
FIELD60150%
MCCAIN10n.m.
New Hampshire Primary
Democratic
CLINTON6558%
OBAMA15-567%
EDWARDS50200%
FIELD0.20n.m.
GORE1.40.4n.m.
Republican
ROMNEY45022%
GIULIANI20050%
THOMPSON(F)15067%
FIELD6-6150%
MCCAIN10n.m.
South Carolina Primary
Democratic
CLINTON50020%
OBAMA25-640%
EDWARDS105100%
FIELD00n.m.
GORE1.51.5n.m.
Republican
ROMNEY50200%
GIULIANI30533%
THOMPSON(F)50-520%
FIELD00n.m.
MCCAIN0.10n.m.
Florida Primary
Democratic
CLINTON8050%
OBAMA10.1-5.90%
EDWARDS0-10%
FIELD000%
GORE000%
Republican
ROMNEY0.100%
GIULIANI5000%
THOMPSON(F)30-100%
FIELD500%
MCCAIN0.800%
Nevada Primary
Democratic
CLINTON7000%
OBAMA1500%
EDWARDS000%
FIELD000%
GORE0.100%
Republican
ROMNEY1530%
GIULIANI30100%
THOMPSON(F)40-150%
MCCAIN000%

Tuesday, August 7, 2007

Just the Numbers: Week 31

THE NUMBERS

Clinton remains strong. In the parleys, the likelihood of a Clinton-Guiliani match-up picked up about 2 points, perhaps not enough to be outside the bid-ask noise, but worth keeping an eye on.

McCain has had a short rebound / bounce. Thompson appears to have "topped out".

THE STRATEGIES

It's hard to find 'inside' strategies remaining. This suggests that naked bets may be all that is possible from here on out.

It's important to decide how a Thompson campaign will affect Romney's chances. If you believe how Thompson is polling ahead of Romney in the Southern primaries and, perhaps, in some of the key states, like Florida and Michigan, then Thompson is a spoiler for a Romney bid, despite Romney's early strength in Iowa and New Hampshire.

If you believe, as I do, that sufficient Thompson delegates go to Guiliani at convention, then the bet is for Giuliani and against Thompson and Romney.

If you are truly risk-seeking, you bet Giuliani straight up, which is worth a 65% payoff by the time it is over. If you aren't sure, then you bet against Thompson, which is worth only 31%.


Next PresidentPr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
CLINTON(H)30.33.82%
GIULIANI2004%
OBAMA19.5-15%
THOMPSON(F)11-3.935%
ROMNEY7-133%
BLOOMBERG4.40.29%
GORE4.30.114%
2007 Week 30: The year is now more than half over; rumors about when Fred Thompson will announce; a daunting 531 days left in the Bush-Cheney Presidency.
GOP NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
GIULIANI35.4-0.42%
THOMPSON(F)31.5-1.21%
ROMNEY18.81.54%
MCCAIN61.25%
PAUL3.20.13%
GINGRICH3.1-0.210%
HUCKABEE0.7-0.1n.m.
DEM NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
CLINTON50.32.31%
OBAMA33.4-2.50%
EDWARDS70.11%
GORE5.41.12%
RICHRDSN2.90.17%
BIDEN1.10.1n.m.
CLARK0.6-0.1n.m.
SenatePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
DEM75.1-0.99%
GOP15-0.167%
Next ExecutivePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
DEM56.4-0.20%
GOP39.50.41%
OTH4.2-0.214%
DEM VP NomineePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
RICHARDSON27011%
OBAMA20.21.718%
WARNER10085%
BAYH9.53.516%
CLARK7.6-0.471%
CLINTON(H)7236%
VILSACK6050%
src: intrade.com; bid-ask are not points, but spread as a percentage of the bid. Polls comparison, via RealClearPolitics.
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: this is just an informational note and not a solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell securities and there is no guarantee implied and people can lose all money on all investments. Numbers are believed to be correct, but do your own math and make your own conclusions or consult with an advisor before making any decisions.

DEM CandidatePr (%)Chg Wk.bid-ask
Iowa Caucus
Democratic
CLINTON35029%
OBAMA202050%
EDWARDS23330%
FIELD0.30.2n.m.
GORE50200%
Republican
ROMNEY41122%
GIULIANI15067%
THOMPSON(F)25040%
FIELD60150%
MCCAIN10n.m.
New Hampshire Primary
Democratic
CLINTON60517%
OBAMA20050%
EDWARDS50200%
FIELD0.20.2n.m.
GORE1-4n.m.
Republican
ROMNEY451022%
GIULIANI20-550%
THOMPSON(F)15-567%
FIELD12625%
MCCAIN10n.m.
South Carolina Primary
Democratic
CLINTON502520%
OBAMA313129%
EDWARDS50200%
FIELD00n.m.
GORE00n.m.
Republican
ROMNEY50200%
GIULIANI25540%
THOMPSON(F)55-59%
FIELD00n.m.
MCCAIN0.10n.m.
Florida Primary
Democratic
CLINTON7510%
OBAMA1600%
EDWARDS110%
FIELD000%
GORE000%
Republican
ROMNEY0.100%
GIULIANI50100%
THOMPSON(F)4000%
FIELD500%
MCCAIN0.80.80%
Nevada Primary
Democratic
CLINTON7000%
OBAMA1500%
EDWARDS000%
FIELD000%
GORE0.1-4.90%
Republican
ROMNEY1200%
GIULIANI2000%
THOMPSON(F)5500%
MCCAIN000%

note: some changes are very large due to incomplete bid data from the prior week.