Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Fair Game? Auto Angst, continued

At the risk of stoking unwanted protectionist flames, I'll just note for those who are intent to push all or most of the blame the way of the auto unions:

  • Item: After tough trade negotiations under Clinton in the 1990s, Japan's auto imports have leveled out for a long time at circa 280,000 units (also here), even against a domestic industry that ought to have been weakened by sluggish economic growth - normally, you'd expect to see domestic share decline in such an environment. (see also, imports shown by car model)
  • Item: Despite growth in manufacturing in the U.S., Japanese production capacity in Japan for export may have grown faster. (The "yen hawks" certainly think so, at least - appear to be backed up by growth rate differential, shown here).
  • Item: The penetration of the Japanese domestic market for foreign suppliers doesn't seem to respond to changes in any financial variables, standing at less than 10%, given a total production of circa 3.2 million cars (peak domestic production has been much higher).
  • Item: the UAW has had troubles organizing the foreign auto manufacturers, for a number of reasons, including that the benefits paid and the employment "guarantees" offered are pretty good.


Rob Reich has a somewhat unexpected take on Chapter 11.

Snark of the Day: If "Economics" Were a National Security Issue ...

SITUATION ANALYSIS - "ECONOMICS IN AMERICA" IS FAILING, INSTITUTIONALLY

Economics is one, of course, because economic outcomes have national security implications.

Look, instead, to how differently we view and handle 'national crisis' that is military in nature versus what is economic in nature.

Indeed, if one got deeply uncharitable, you could say that the entire, massive multi-decade effort of the NBER to provide the data and understanding, even in exigent circumstances, sufficient to addressing precisely the kind of mess we are in today has failed and that shortcoming looks set to get worse, alongside the pain in the real economy, before it gets better.
The military have a chain, a coordinated Joint-Chiefs, and an almost unbelievable ability to marshal its resources to develop a situation analysis that is comprehensive -theoretically and otherwise - and cutting edge, under pressure and in time. The net result of this is to provide a range of options and opinions.

Can we say that "economics in America" has provided anything remotely similar, timely, and comprehensive? Are we supposed to divine a decent situation analysis from a long series of finger-pointing and back-and-forth along ideological lines?

Wall Street itself appears increasingly to have its knives out for the Federal Reserve, if you read the tea leaves.

The TARP, the ultimate everything bagel, reflects technical differences and information deficits, not just policy disagreements. On the whole, as originally conceived, it might be the equivalent of launching an air war, when boots on the ground were needed...

In short, our National Council of Economic Advisers seems institutionally insufficient to the job, no parallel to the National Security Council. We've had an economic 9/11, arguably. Are they handling it better than the CIA?

Even critical decision-quality data on systemwide mortgage defaults and mortgage loan structures seems elusive, out of the public's hands. Recall that it wasn't until after the 1930s that people decided it might be a good idea to have public, formal, comprehensive data on the basics of the economy, including labor statistics and everything else. History is repeating itself?

Indeed, if one got deeply uncharitable, you could say that the entire, massive multi-decade effort of the NBER to provide the data and understanding sufficient, even in exigent circumstances, to addressing precisely the kind of mess we are in today has failed and that shortcoming looks set to get worse, alongside the pain in the real economy, before it gets better.

The Case for General Motors

They have improved profitability, because they have dealt with their healthcare costs.

The price for that was their liquidity "reserve", arguably, what they need to weather a normal-sized downturn. If we had had a single-payor system, that might have been an avoidable loss. At least, that's one way to see the two sides of the coin.

Anyway, the case for them might be centered around the fact that they have yet to realize their new levels of profitability, because of a cyclical volume downturn (oil, credit the proximate causes thereof...not "unions"). On the other side of the cycle, they might be quite competitive.

BANKRUPTCY

The case for bankruptcy seems to center on discharging debt and giving them the long-needed tools to manage their dealer network more ... ruthlessly.

The debt burden doesn't look huge. Is it?

On a strategic basis, a return of consumer lending and leasing seems to be at least as critical. They could sell their minority stake in the old financing arm and get assistance to start up a new, captive financing arm. That would be enormously positive for their long-term outlook, right?

RE-ORGANIZATION

The case for a radical re-make of the industry is not to put more and more manufacturers together, for scale and cost savings.

It might be, given the rapid pace of technology change we want from the industry, to imagine an industry, as it once was, with many manufacturers, not three-to-six.

Smashing the industry into bits, however interesting a proposition, seems well beyond the scope of what can be done in a short amount of time, however. Same for the cultural "issues" that plague the business mentality of formerly large, stable firms who are faced with change.

More on AIG's CDO Special Facility

I missed it before, but the Fed's release actually says that AIG's CDS will be unwound, as part of the "multi-sector" CDO facility that it is setting up with AIG.

AIG had been "amortizing" $6 billion a quarter in mark-to-market losses. Assuming that defaults continue apace, causing more mark-to-market losses, this unwind will cut that (how much, it is hard to tell - possibly up to 60%). AIG will no longer have to run big losses through its income statement and worry about ratings agencies.

AIG says that stress losses could range from 7.8 to 12.0 billion. If I understand that calculation right, that's what they think the underlying CDO losses might be, in deteriorating circumstances. The Fed will end up with some part of those losses in the facility (depending on how much is bought), but AIG will cover the first 5.0 billion.

An Apalling Lack of Legal Creativity

I may be wrong, but I cannot understand why someone has not yet come up with a creative legal solution to the following problem, absent the contentious bankruptcy code modification:

From the WSJ:

Sen. Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.) said in a statement that “a program like this will only scratch the surface of the mortgage crisis.”

“No amount of incentives for investors can change the fact that a program like this will only really work if Fannie and Freddie hold the whole loan, which is true in too few cases,” he said. “When the loan is chopped up into a million pieces and any investor can block a modification from happening.” Schumer said the only solution is to alter the bankruptcy code.


I would think that there are all kinds of shades to this, including making certain contractual provisions against public policy, thereby making such loans eligible for refinancing on other terms.

A limited indemnification for servicers for certain loan types or years.

The temporary imposition of treble or quadruple damages or an excise tax, collectible at the source, that make even the super-senior people find modifications in their interest. In the same vein, finding a way to structure a benign but effective right of recourse of the subordinated holders, in a very targeted or limited way, if a senior holder makes a "non-economic" choice that affects the entire pool.

Tuesday, November 11, 2008

GM versus Housing Market

It's a sad day in the Republic when you have to assess which is the bigger worry; and, therefore, how to take news of a first-step modified loans program, at last, from the Bush Administration, that is more than "Hope Now"...

Right now, I'd bet that the housing market worries are larger, at least in the short-run.

Chart of the Day

Super-Contango (via alphaville) Since there is obviously no supply reason to be "running at the tops", the thesis is that credit-crunch distorted "imputed carry-costs" are distorting the market ... Let's hope, right?

Floyd Gives the Dope on AIG's SPV

FED DOES TARP

As I suspected, the collateral posted is in play, but not in the way I thought.

It will go toward the purchase price of the CDOs, so that the Fed gets up to $70+5 billion CDOs for the $35 billion that it has put up in cash for the SPV, or better than half of AIG's net "multi-sector CDO" exposure. AIG will take "subordinated" exposure to the first $5 billion in Fed losses (what "subordinated" means, in this context, is laughable).

Flloyd Norris has the dope. [n.b. he's the only one I've seen throw out the $70 billion figure. AIG, so far as I know, has not said how much collateral has been posted in aggregate, have they?]

The staggering "securities lending" "business" will ... also get a $22B TARP-like relief from the FED, who will purchase illiquid securities, to remove the stress on that part of the AIG, as it shuts it down.

I continue to believe that there is more to the story here than "securities lending". It just requires too much to believe that this could have occurred quite the way it is described ...

Greed, Sedated

Update: Michael Lewis (just commented on below) might love this:


Still, Mr. Niederhoffer [funds up 50% YTD] is not planning any celebrations.

“The greatest danger at a time like this is hubris,” he said. He has banned fist-pumping victory poses on his trading floor.

Is bigger better?

Paul Krugman thinks so.


My advice to the Obama people is to figure out how much help they think the economy needs, then add 50 percent. ...

I'm not sure we've got the academics to put their finger directly on what the problem is, unless "general economic weakness" is sufficient.

For instance, "the problem" during the 1930s was a broken banking system and a restrictive monetary policy, as much as anything.

Today, we have what imbalances, exactly, that need to be worked through?

So, my completely presumptuous advice to the academics is also simple, but twofold:

For the sake of robust solution prescription, imagine that you are wrong (perhaps because 'the problem', to which you have not specified a particular solution, goes on a LOT longer than you expect at the outset) and that the markets, at their harshest, come to believe all your efforts are limited and temporary.

Then figure out what legacy you would like to have left, in that instance, from your early actions and follow-on actions.

It'd be more than some re-paved roads, re-built bridges, and some relief programs, yes? It'd have to be a lot more than "rebuild the military", right?

It would have to be some "true improvements", measured one way or another, right? I'll leave that open-ended, because I've already voiced some ideas and don't want to end the list with just those.

For the second part:
Consider afterward that you are "wrong" in the other direction, that the 'imbalances' move more quickly than expect to resolution and the market consensus is that your efforts are sufficient and

Then, figure out how to tailor your approach (perhaps involving public-private partnership?), so that you are not over-extended, from the outset, or so that you share the outcome(s) with other stakeholders.
Put another way, the government need not go-it-alone. Risk sharing helps. There may be other ideas about how to scale back projects or work on a list of projects, some of which may be canceled.

Whatever the case, simply throwing money at the problem could be - could be - a recipe to become, as Japan did, the Italy of the East.


Just as a side note: those people who complain about a hidden "big government" in Paul's writings. Paul just proposed a massive, long-term re-investment in capitalism, didn't he?

"Wall Street Had Built a Doomsday Machine"

Ladies and Gentlemen, the incomparable Michael Lewis.

Good to the last drop. Read it all. It's rapturous.

(The only fault I often have with Lewis's writing is that he leaves the impression that everyone who goes to Wall Street ends up wealthy. The truth is that a lot of people on Wall Street never touch the riches. Even among those eligible to get crumbs, the financial press frequently does things like divide total compensation by headcount to print figures like "$1million per employee". My sense is that is so false as to be genuinely unhelpful, with the concentration of the income at the top, almost 90/10...)

Other things to note: Lewis actually uses the names of some of the sub-prime companies in his piece. I'm so tired of see bland charts of "default rates" that make it seem like it all was an act of God, not man-made.

PERSONAL FAVs - RAILROADS IN AFRICA!



Although it's disrespectful of the author, here are some of my personal favs:


About low-quality companies:

He recited the line from memory: “ ‘The Lomas Financial Corp. is a perfectly hedged financial institution: It loses money in every conceivable interest-rate environment.’
On mortgage companies' printing presses:

In Bakersfield, California, a Mexican strawberry picker with an income of $14,000 and no English was lent every penny he needed to buy a house for $720,000.

About synthetics:

"There weren’t enough Americans with shitty credit taking out loans to satisfy investors’ appetite for the end product."


On the indefatigable Merrill Lynch:

“We have a simple thesis,” Eisman explained. “There is going to be a calamity, and whenever there is a calamity, Merrill is there.”


GLOOM to the Left, GLOOM to the Right

I'm not sure if it is me or not, but today seems like one of the fucking gloomiest financial news-flow days that I can remember ...

Monday, November 10, 2008

AIG Shows Guts of CDO portfolio

FED SPV BRINGS BUYER AND SELLER ONE-STEP CLOSER

I'm not sure if they have published this before, but if you take a peek at appendix A (under the Credit Presentation link), you get to see what's inside some of the CDOs that carry AIG's default protection.

It is amazing (to those not in the know) the range of collateral that is in some of these. There is no general 80/20 rule obviously at work (80% good stuff, 20% quasi-speculative stuff). I'm not sure if that means anything, other than a lot of confidence in modeling the underlying risk of instruments and less attention to broad, "commonsense" ways of mitigating loss (through apportionment).

Only $16.4B of the original "AAA" underlying portfolio amount of $55B remains rated "AAA", less than what is now "junk" ($18B).

CDO36 had 53% "CDO", which I take to mean AIG were plenty comfortable with so-called "CDO-square" risks (and how little look-through transparency this kind of report might yield for that). Indeed, they model these in their "stress tests" by calling this collateral "inner CDOs", as I understand it, to designate those "held inside". (I cannot judge whether their assumptions are aggressive or not for "inner CDOs").

As I understand it, the "attach" and "detach" points are meant to indicate the "stop" and "start" default-loss levels between which a credit insurance writer is 'on the hook'. Given the wide range of collateral, it's almost impossible, it seems, to make a general, eyeball characterization about just how optimistic they were in setting these cutoffs when they wrote the CDS.



They report $120B less in net exposure than gross exposure on the residential mortgage CDS portfolio - it's not clear to the untrained what they are netting out, exactly, collateral or offsetting CDS.

Projecting their net exposure is difficult (there are "2a-7 puts", afterall ...). Some of the CDS they wrote to help "regulatory capital" requirements appear like they could be in a steady amortization (and thereby, risk reduction). There was a $6.2 billion - billion - "currency fluctuation" in the multi-sector portfolios net exposure...so ... don't think you know everything.

Their loss severity on prime, for the same vintage, is half what it is on sub-prime. Not sure why that makes sense, off hand (isn't a default, a default, a default? Do prime have that much more equity on average for the vintages in question?)

They have $31 billion so far in cumulative mark-to-market losses (which they hope will reverse, no doubt) and $12 billion in guesstimated, heavily qualified "stress test" risk in the book(s). Here are two quotes that give you pause that the losses will reverse:

To trigger a default on the most secure subprime RMBS debt - rated AAA, and structured with a typical 18 per cent attachment rate - foreclosure rates would have to reach the 30 per cent.-FT Alphaville, November 7th, 2007


Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' current ratings on the 2006 subprime U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) vintage reflect, in part, an assumed loss severity of 45%. That assumption includes our estimate that, based on our views on the current housing market environment, foreclosure costs and market value declines account for losses of 26.3% and 18.7%, respectively, in the loan balances of these mortgages. We project a 19% aggregate loss for subprime mortgages backing U.S. RMBS sold in 2006 based on assumptions for foreclosure and loss severity. The 19% assumption is the product of projected foreclosures of approximately 42% and the assumed loss severity of 45%.-May 7th, 2008

Paulson's Cash-n-Carry guy isn't the one buying up the CDOs, it's the Fed using a Fed financed SPV, this time. Is this purchase predictable? Preventative? Probably. Could it facilitate an unwind of this credit protection sink-hole? Yes... Could it facilitate the Fed, as counterparty, dropping collateral requirements? Yes... Still, an unlevered $30B looks like just a fig newton, clocking, as it does, at just 1/4 of the multi-sector portfolio's net exposure...

Anyway, if any reader wants, I found an open-source model for risks that I think I'll have a look at, time permitting.

http://tinyurl.com/ypr6c4

Paulson's Treasury, Continued Inaction

PAULSON FIDDLES WHILE ROME BURNS

Another week passes, and nothing done at Treasury to combat preventable foreclosures.

Sure, JP-Chase announced a voluntary plan, one with no GAO accountability, no reporting, no audit, no ... urgency, even? Did the other major lenders follow? BOA? Not that I saw, did you?

Accordingly, the "balance sheet" cycle continues. The bond-insurers have not received anything, and get downgraded. AIG is now consolidating its losses at another $40 billion highe, up to circa $170B, now, including two mop-up vehicles (!), CP access via the Fed, a TARP infusion, "bridge financing", and a partridge in a pear tree.

Why we want to continue to deal with this problem solely through the banks and non-targeted, broad-spray "fiscal stimulus" is beyond me, so long as there are direct-action plans to consider, even a ideas to creatively remake the mortgage market (the Danish model?), so that it can handle price swings in the future more adeptly.

Even if you are a die-hard TARPer, why are the bond insurer's not being delt with in a summary and quick fashion? Have we unwound the entire "synthetic CDO" problem, yet?

THE "PUBLIC DEAL SHEET" - COUNTRY FIRST, OF COURSE



Remember when Paulson's go-to guy release a "public deal sheet" for the TARP, a term that was natural to him, but laughable in context, right?

Well, it turns out there may have been major bones thrown to their own, in the details:

The change to Section 382 of the tax code -- a provision that limited a kind of tax shelter arising in corporate mergers -- came after a two-decade effort by conservative economists and Republican administration officials to eliminate or overhaul the law, which is so little-known that even influential tax experts sometimes draw a blank at its mention. Until the financial meltdown, its opponents thought it would be nearly impossible to revamp the section because this would look like a corporate giveaway, according to lobbyists.