Showing posts with label CDS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CDS. Show all posts

Thursday, December 4, 2008

After Ten Years of "Innovation", What More Do We Know About How to Price (or Trade) Credit Risk?

INABILITY TO ISOLATE "THE PROBLEMS" LEADS TO RADICAL DOUBT

If you want a qausi-seminal piece that will challenge you in every direction, have a look, maybe, at the Sam Jones bit in the Alpahville about Synthetic CDOs and, by incorporation, the pieces by Felix Salmon and Alan Kohler.

It doesn't aspire to be "seminal", but it juxtaposes market structure with technological understanding, for example,

For the monolines and insurers, this wouldn’t have been such a dreadful problem had they not also invested in the underlying notes of many CDO structures: a move that led to the rating agencies downgrading them, and thus exposing them to collateral calls on their billions of leveraged super-senior swaps.

and an explanation how a perceived need drove design, alongside an historical bit of what went wrong when those designs proved insufficient:

Citi’s dalliance with LSS conduits and the commercial paper markets was equally catastrophic. In the summer of 2007, it caused the collapse of several large conduits in Canada. That in turn precipitated a global buyers strike in asset-backed CP. Which spread, in turn, to a buyers strike of all financial CP. Thus ratcheting up the threat of banking collapses, and indeed, leading directly to them, in Germany, and in the UK (Northern Rock).
This goes well beyond the ongoing talky-talk about originate-to-distribute market structure.

If you are very late to the game of understanding today's structured products (like me), their role in the crisis, and trying to separate dysfunction from abuse, you probably could count yourself close to it if you grasped this piece, in detail, not just gravamen.

And that understanding is not easy to come by, not the least of which is that there are so many moving parts to these structures and little commentary on how they were used and by whom in what proportions. So, for instance, if you wanted to make a judgment about whether and how these securities should be regulated, you'll just be left asking for more data, most likely.

HIDING RISK AS A PRECURSOR TO TRANSFERRING IT


Economists are quick to laud the benefits of financial innovation. Perhaps they should consider the "start-up" costs of it, the context in which it occurs.

If "innovation" in the medical sciences is marked by a caution sufficient to protecting the credibility of the science itself, then the hallmark of financial innovation seems to be the reverse, on average - at least when it is applied to "investments".

Case in point: read through the prospectus for a synthetic CDO contraption (kindly provided by one of Felix's readers). Do you think you could make an adequate assessment of the risk-characteristics of any one of the notes (tranches) to be sold? Would you "invest" a billion dollars based on 'Moody's model input #2', even if you had no fear of models and modelling in general? Is it any wonder that Steve Eisman is a rich man today, for having noticed this?

JUNK BOND (SUBPRIME) MANIA

Commentators talk about the massive mis-pricing of credit risk, at the heart of the current crisis. But, that cannot be the whole of it.

Why?

Well, ask yourself, how could trillions of dollars be written on sub-prime mortgage risks, either cash or synthetic (!), with such a short history by which to judge their risk characteristics? Wouldn't prudence dictate that you make the most radically conservative assumptions (about joint transition and default probabilities), before betting so much money? I mean that to apply to both seller and buyer, one interested in preserving (and building) their marketplace overtime, the other interested in managing known unkowns, the downside risks.

How much were the risks simply hidden and not just in rational self-deception? Hard to say. Were the assumptions that launched the era certifiably blue-sky? Were people perfectly right to be so wrong? Does financial innovation somehow require a non-simulated crisis or catastrophe, in order to complete its own cycle, to calibrate itself? That's like saying, "until these things are liquidated, no one really knows what the value of them will be." Is that true?

Whatever leads buyers and sellers to kid themselves ex ante, doing so creates what I like to call "opaque potential", which is the spawning ground for almost all financial manias.

That all financial innovation is fertile ground for a financial mania is probably untrue, but being able to spot which ones are is probably not as much of an art as some may think.

Monday, November 10, 2008

AIG Shows Guts of CDO portfolio

FED SPV BRINGS BUYER AND SELLER ONE-STEP CLOSER

I'm not sure if they have published this before, but if you take a peek at appendix A (under the Credit Presentation link), you get to see what's inside some of the CDOs that carry AIG's default protection.

It is amazing (to those not in the know) the range of collateral that is in some of these. There is no general 80/20 rule obviously at work (80% good stuff, 20% quasi-speculative stuff). I'm not sure if that means anything, other than a lot of confidence in modeling the underlying risk of instruments and less attention to broad, "commonsense" ways of mitigating loss (through apportionment).

Only $16.4B of the original "AAA" underlying portfolio amount of $55B remains rated "AAA", less than what is now "junk" ($18B).

CDO36 had 53% "CDO", which I take to mean AIG were plenty comfortable with so-called "CDO-square" risks (and how little look-through transparency this kind of report might yield for that). Indeed, they model these in their "stress tests" by calling this collateral "inner CDOs", as I understand it, to designate those "held inside". (I cannot judge whether their assumptions are aggressive or not for "inner CDOs").

As I understand it, the "attach" and "detach" points are meant to indicate the "stop" and "start" default-loss levels between which a credit insurance writer is 'on the hook'. Given the wide range of collateral, it's almost impossible, it seems, to make a general, eyeball characterization about just how optimistic they were in setting these cutoffs when they wrote the CDS.



They report $120B less in net exposure than gross exposure on the residential mortgage CDS portfolio - it's not clear to the untrained what they are netting out, exactly, collateral or offsetting CDS.

Projecting their net exposure is difficult (there are "2a-7 puts", afterall ...). Some of the CDS they wrote to help "regulatory capital" requirements appear like they could be in a steady amortization (and thereby, risk reduction). There was a $6.2 billion - billion - "currency fluctuation" in the multi-sector portfolios net exposure...so ... don't think you know everything.

Their loss severity on prime, for the same vintage, is half what it is on sub-prime. Not sure why that makes sense, off hand (isn't a default, a default, a default? Do prime have that much more equity on average for the vintages in question?)

They have $31 billion so far in cumulative mark-to-market losses (which they hope will reverse, no doubt) and $12 billion in guesstimated, heavily qualified "stress test" risk in the book(s). Here are two quotes that give you pause that the losses will reverse:

To trigger a default on the most secure subprime RMBS debt - rated AAA, and structured with a typical 18 per cent attachment rate - foreclosure rates would have to reach the 30 per cent.-FT Alphaville, November 7th, 2007


Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' current ratings on the 2006 subprime U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) vintage reflect, in part, an assumed loss severity of 45%. That assumption includes our estimate that, based on our views on the current housing market environment, foreclosure costs and market value declines account for losses of 26.3% and 18.7%, respectively, in the loan balances of these mortgages. We project a 19% aggregate loss for subprime mortgages backing U.S. RMBS sold in 2006 based on assumptions for foreclosure and loss severity. The 19% assumption is the product of projected foreclosures of approximately 42% and the assumed loss severity of 45%.-May 7th, 2008

Paulson's Cash-n-Carry guy isn't the one buying up the CDOs, it's the Fed using a Fed financed SPV, this time. Is this purchase predictable? Preventative? Probably. Could it facilitate an unwind of this credit protection sink-hole? Yes... Could it facilitate the Fed, as counterparty, dropping collateral requirements? Yes... Still, an unlevered $30B looks like just a fig newton, clocking, as it does, at just 1/4 of the multi-sector portfolio's net exposure...

Anyway, if any reader wants, I found an open-source model for risks that I think I'll have a look at, time permitting.

http://tinyurl.com/ypr6c4

Monday, October 13, 2008

The Depository Trust Makes a First Stab

The DTC, grand pooh-bah of major clearing, makes a first pass at trying to clear up misconceptions about Credit Default Swaps.

The most important:

  • At settlement, the payments are netted. That step greatly reduces counterparty risk(s). The amount that they expect (or estimate) to change hands over the Lehman default is ... circa $6 billion. That's a very small figure compared to the daily dollar amounts traded in Foreign Exchange.

Things they need to do.

  • -They should take the step of publishing the net exposures, by institutions. That will chip away at that $34 trillion figure and provide much need transparency.
  • -"less than 1%" should actually be quantified. Is it near $348 billion or is it $440 billion? How does that net out?

Things we need to do.

  • -"Vast majority" has to turn into all and every, just as soon as possible.