FED SPV BRINGS BUYER AND SELLER ONE-STEP CLOSER
I'm not sure if they have published this before, but if you take a peek at appendix A (under the Credit Presentation link), you get to see what's inside some of the CDOs that carry AIG's default protection.
It is amazing (to those not in the know) the range of collateral that is in some of these. There is no general 80/20 rule obviously at work (80% good stuff, 20% quasi-speculative stuff). I'm not sure if that means anything, other than a lot of confidence in modeling the underlying risk of instruments and less attention to broad, "commonsense" ways of mitigating loss (through apportionment).
Only $16.4B of the original "AAA" underlying portfolio amount of $55B remains rated "AAA", less than what is now "junk" ($18B).
CDO36 had 53% "CDO", which I take to mean AIG were plenty comfortable with so-called "CDO-square" risks (and how little look-through transparency this kind of report might yield for that). Indeed, they model these in their "stress tests" by calling this collateral "inner CDOs", as I understand it, to designate those "held inside". (I cannot judge whether their assumptions are aggressive or not for "inner CDOs").
As I understand it, the "attach" and "detach" points are meant to indicate the "stop" and "start" default-loss levels between which a credit insurance writer is 'on the hook'. Given the wide range of collateral, it's almost impossible, it seems, to make a general, eyeball characterization about just how optimistic they were in setting these cutoffs when they wrote the CDS.
They report $120B less in net exposure than gross exposure on the residential mortgage CDS portfolio - it's not clear to the untrained what they are netting out, exactly, collateral or offsetting CDS.
Projecting their net exposure is difficult (there are "2a-7 puts", afterall ...). Some of the CDS they wrote to help "regulatory capital" requirements appear like they could be in a steady amortization (and thereby, risk reduction). There was a $6.2 billion - billion - "currency fluctuation" in the multi-sector portfolios net exposure...so ... don't think you know everything.
Their loss severity on prime, for the same vintage, is half what it is on sub-prime. Not sure why that makes sense, off hand (isn't a default, a default, a default? Do prime have that much more equity on average for the vintages in question?)
They have $31 billion so far in cumulative mark-to-market losses (which they hope will reverse, no doubt) and $12 billion in guesstimated, heavily qualified "stress test" risk in the book(s). Here are two quotes that give you pause that the losses will reverse:
Paulson's Cash-n-Carry guy isn't the one buying up the CDOs, it's the Fed using a Fed financed SPV, this time. Is this purchase predictable? Preventative? Probably. Could it facilitate an unwind of this credit protection sink-hole? Yes... Could it facilitate the Fed, as counterparty, dropping collateral requirements? Yes... Still, an unlevered $30B looks like just a fig newton, clocking, as it does, at just 1/4 of the multi-sector portfolio's net exposure...
Anyway, if any reader wants, I found an open-source model for risks that I think I'll have a look at, time permitting.
http://tinyurl.com/ypr6c4
Monday, November 10, 2008
AIG Shows Guts of CDO portfolio
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10:30 PM
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Thursday, October 30, 2008
Securities Lending? Are you serious?
AIG DETAILS
Just when you thought your jaw couldn't drop to the floor, again, this year, you learn something new.
AIG lost $18 billion - billion - in its securities lending business. (h/t Felix Salmon)
Now, I'm out of it, but securities lending used to be one of those super-great, side businesses that turned an "extra" 2-5% a year, at almost no risk required.
So, to have lost $18 billion ... well, one just has to stagger back. 'Securities lending' must have been a euphemism for Casino Royal. Although this bit of information is in no way conclusive, it raises the prospect, not of some bets gone wrong, but of an almost abject loss of internal controls.Of the two big Fed loans, the smaller one, the $38 billion supplementary lending facility, was extended solely to prevent further losses in the securities-lending business. So far, $18 billion has been drawn down for that purpose.
For securities lending, an institution with a long time horizon makes extra money by lending out securities to shorter-term borrowers. The borrowers are often hedge funds setting up short trades, betting a stock’s price will fall. They typically give A.I.G. cash or cashlike instruments in return. Then, while A.I.G. waits for the borrowers to bring back the securities, it invests the money.
In the last few months, borrowers came back for their money, and A.I.G. did not have enough to repay them because of market losses on its investments. Through the secondary lending facility, the insurer is now sending those investments to the Fed, and getting cash in turn to repay customers.
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10:16 PM
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Labels: 2008 Financial Crisis, AIG
