Friday, December 5, 2008

Trump is no Carnegie

Of course, the Empire State Building was built during the onset of the Great Depression.

But, that's not good enough for Donald Trump.

He wants his money back, more or less. [Trump Sees Act of God in Recession]

Floyd Norris chuckles:


I read a fair number of lawsuits in this job, and Mr. Trump’s are among the most colorful. I get the impression that the lawyers do not always control the drafting.

Flat with Beer Chaser

Despite stepped up prevention, foreclosure starts were flat on the latest MBA dipstick:

“In the last quarter we saw about 575,000 foreclosure actions started, compared with an estimated 580,000 in the second quarter and 535,000 in the first quarter. At this rate we are looking at finishing 2008 at about 2.2 million foreclosure actions started. Absent a recession, the 2009 number would likely have fallen by several hundred thousand but the effects of job losses and general economic deterioration make the 2009 outlook worse, particularly if mortgage problems [?] become more widespread,” Brinkmann said.

This means that Ben's guesstimate for 2.25 million, from just yesterday, is kinda the best case scenario, other things being equal.

The figures may have been influenced upwards by the end of state moratoriums on foreclosures (why the data cannot be adjusted for this, only the MBA knows...). How many more mortgage foreclosures from California and Florida are possible (they are about half of the foreclosure total)? Good grief.

Meanwhile, serious delinquencies are at previously unrecorded levels... Prime is up at 2.87%. At 0.52/quarter, that's an acceleration given a y/o/r rate of up 1.56. Somehow these delinquencies are being cured, because the foreclosure start rate for prime is flat and those already in foreclosure is up a lot less (0.16 t 1.58), on the MBA survey data, at least.

-533, THIS is how a recession feels

The media headline comparisons to "the worst on record" are not standardized.

As a percentage decline in the workforce, it is about 0.4%. That puts it on par with the 81-82 drop and twice the size of the 91-92 falloff.

It's well below the 74-75 worst experience.

On the longer record, there are monthly drops that are double ...

Update of interest: There are many years in which there were no monthly falls in payroll employment. However, this is the first year that there will likely be no monthly increase in payroll employment. This is a long series. That's pretty stunning. In 1982 there were two up months and in 2001, just one. They were small, but still up (seasonally adjusted).

Holy Super-Contango, Batman

The Super Contango is now a Giant Super Contango.

Prices here.

(I don't want to be around when this rubber band snaps.)

GM Dealers' Pinch

Turns out that working capital loans, i.e. floorplan financing, is pinched.

You know this if you listen to Donnie D (more like hear it in the background than l-i-s-t-e-n), but Wagoner confirmed it yesterday. Said that the crunch-related adjustment will hit manufacturer production in January, most likely (maybe down over a stunning 50%).

Last Chance to Save BOA, Today

Shareholders will vote the (overpriced) deal for Merrill. They should ... just say "no".

Justin Fox explains:

The reason we are not in investment banking business in a large way is that it's culturally incompatible with the traditional banking business.


Felix Salmon piles on:

Investment banks have a natural tendency to expand until they use all of the balance sheet they're given. ... they're constitutionally incapable of constraining themselves. And when they merge with -- even when they're taken over by -- commercial banks, they invariably end up taking over the host organism and seeding their high-tech products all over its balance sheet.

CEO Lewis? Well, he's on the Sports Illustrated cover, and you know what that means:

"It is incumbent on all of us to help our industry find a new balance between the desire for economic growth and the need for market stability," Lewis said at a dinner in New York after receiving American Banker's Banker of the Year Award.

BOA shareholders will rue the day. $5 Billion in write-downs expected in their opening quarter together, and the Merrill Board also approved an unchanged dividend. Red is the color for this wedding, in every sense of the word.

$875 Billion in deposits at risk. Taxpayer guarantees now going to support ...

Thursday, December 4, 2008

Federal Reserve Talk Among Themselves

A scan through Ben's speech today leaves one ... underwhelmed.

More than a year after the prognostications of rate-resets and the prospect for widespread defaults/foreclosures, and the Fed has its first conference that ... touches on preventable foreclosure.

More than two years after housing prices peaked, the implications for the real economy from foreclosure ... er, get high-level attention?

And you know just how bad it is, when you dig into the references and you find out that the Federal Government, in 2008, is licensing the data it desperately needs in order to do policy formation and that data is ... incomplete:

We use data licensed from LoanPerformance as the basis for our analysis. We define a subprime loan as a loan in a subprime pool and likewise an Alt-A loan as a loan in an Alt-A pool. Thus, these data will not include risky mortgages that lenders keep rather than securitize; about 75 percent of subprime originations were securitized in recent years ...
To measure is to manage.

After Ten Years of "Innovation", What More Do We Know About How to Price (or Trade) Credit Risk?

INABILITY TO ISOLATE "THE PROBLEMS" LEADS TO RADICAL DOUBT

If you want a qausi-seminal piece that will challenge you in every direction, have a look, maybe, at the Sam Jones bit in the Alpahville about Synthetic CDOs and, by incorporation, the pieces by Felix Salmon and Alan Kohler.

It doesn't aspire to be "seminal", but it juxtaposes market structure with technological understanding, for example,

For the monolines and insurers, this wouldn’t have been such a dreadful problem had they not also invested in the underlying notes of many CDO structures: a move that led to the rating agencies downgrading them, and thus exposing them to collateral calls on their billions of leveraged super-senior swaps.

and an explanation how a perceived need drove design, alongside an historical bit of what went wrong when those designs proved insufficient:

Citi’s dalliance with LSS conduits and the commercial paper markets was equally catastrophic. In the summer of 2007, it caused the collapse of several large conduits in Canada. That in turn precipitated a global buyers strike in asset-backed CP. Which spread, in turn, to a buyers strike of all financial CP. Thus ratcheting up the threat of banking collapses, and indeed, leading directly to them, in Germany, and in the UK (Northern Rock).
This goes well beyond the ongoing talky-talk about originate-to-distribute market structure.

If you are very late to the game of understanding today's structured products (like me), their role in the crisis, and trying to separate dysfunction from abuse, you probably could count yourself close to it if you grasped this piece, in detail, not just gravamen.

And that understanding is not easy to come by, not the least of which is that there are so many moving parts to these structures and little commentary on how they were used and by whom in what proportions. So, for instance, if you wanted to make a judgment about whether and how these securities should be regulated, you'll just be left asking for more data, most likely.

HIDING RISK AS A PRECURSOR TO TRANSFERRING IT


Economists are quick to laud the benefits of financial innovation. Perhaps they should consider the "start-up" costs of it, the context in which it occurs.

If "innovation" in the medical sciences is marked by a caution sufficient to protecting the credibility of the science itself, then the hallmark of financial innovation seems to be the reverse, on average - at least when it is applied to "investments".

Case in point: read through the prospectus for a synthetic CDO contraption (kindly provided by one of Felix's readers). Do you think you could make an adequate assessment of the risk-characteristics of any one of the notes (tranches) to be sold? Would you "invest" a billion dollars based on 'Moody's model input #2', even if you had no fear of models and modelling in general? Is it any wonder that Steve Eisman is a rich man today, for having noticed this?

JUNK BOND (SUBPRIME) MANIA

Commentators talk about the massive mis-pricing of credit risk, at the heart of the current crisis. But, that cannot be the whole of it.

Why?

Well, ask yourself, how could trillions of dollars be written on sub-prime mortgage risks, either cash or synthetic (!), with such a short history by which to judge their risk characteristics? Wouldn't prudence dictate that you make the most radically conservative assumptions (about joint transition and default probabilities), before betting so much money? I mean that to apply to both seller and buyer, one interested in preserving (and building) their marketplace overtime, the other interested in managing known unkowns, the downside risks.

How much were the risks simply hidden and not just in rational self-deception? Hard to say. Were the assumptions that launched the era certifiably blue-sky? Were people perfectly right to be so wrong? Does financial innovation somehow require a non-simulated crisis or catastrophe, in order to complete its own cycle, to calibrate itself? That's like saying, "until these things are liquidated, no one really knows what the value of them will be." Is that true?

Whatever leads buyers and sellers to kid themselves ex ante, doing so creates what I like to call "opaque potential", which is the spawning ground for almost all financial manias.

That all financial innovation is fertile ground for a financial mania is probably untrue, but being able to spot which ones are is probably not as much of an art as some may think.

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

Bear Food

PLEASE DON'T FEED THE BEARS

Okay, so, now that refi index has spiked and Bill Gross had said mortgage rates will have a four handle, who owns the CMOs and doesn't know what they are doing?

Chart of the Day


From Felix Salmon, via PIMCO, a view of Tobin's Q. Notice that if you used the Q in 1996 (the last time I remember talking about it with anyone), you'd have "missed" the great run-up of the late 90s...

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

Allocation Nightmare

GO LONG!

Among the retail accessible asset classes, this has turned into one of the biggest "kick-me's" of the year, from an asset-allocation perspective:

The so-called long bond has returned 27.8 percent this year, including a 15.6 percent gain in November, Merrill Lynch & Co. index data show. The debt is poised for the best annual performance since rallying 34 percent 13 years ago.

Yields touched 3.1789 percent today, the lowest since the U.S. began regular auctions of the securities in 1977. -Bloomberg

Morningstar reports that the average long government bond fund is half that return.

THE NASTY END OF 'DO YOU HAVE ENOUGH INFLATION PROTECTION?'

Meanwhile, TIPs have hardly been a dreamy asset class. The average inflation protect bond fund is off some 7.8%, with large funds like PIMCO's off another 4.5% beyond that... That's a lot of jazz for an asset class with an historical annual volatility between 1% and 2%. (One fund company has inflation protected funds off over 20% YTD!)

CANNERY ROW ALLOCATIONS

Last, it is noteworthy that the average, canned "Conservative Allocation Fund" is off over 23% YTD.

Personally, I cannot believe ever letting that happen to a client. You can bet that dynamic/tactical allocators, like me, won't be back in demand soon, however.... (if I'm wrong, let me know!).

Monday, December 1, 2008

Meridith - Still Good For A Big Bear Day

EASY MONEY - 9% DOWN IN EQUITIES TODAY

In the face of expanded holiday shopping over Black Friday, rising real disposable income, and massive oil price decline, upcoming stimulus (probably including 'retail' tax cuts), today we suddenly realize that banks may pull credit lines?

Clearly, the bears are just out today to grab any "rally food" they can, right? I mean, apart from China's turnabout and Hank "Menace to the Markets" Paulson coming out to say that he was, after another week, still studying the problem of preventable foreclosures.

If anything, the message is clear that the banks cannot try to write the best vintage "loans" during the immediate crisis, without risking the very downturn that they would hope to forestall, collectively, right?

Average margins in the credit card business are on the rise. There is $200 billion in cheap financing from the Federal Reserve available. At 2/3rds of an entire year's volume, that's a fair amount of flash-money at the margin, even if it is unnecessarily restricted to 'AAA' credit only, IMHO.

Willingness to lend is a serious concern that needs to be addressed.

Potentially a more serious, long-term adjustment is the large number of people who may get shut out of the consumer credit markets, because our current Treasury Secretary and his boss have decided that the best way to handle the housing market bubble is to "let foreclosures work". For the average lender balance-sheet, I'd bet that the average REO is an order of magnitude larger than the average credit card balance.

Innovation or Exploitation?

HOLDING JUDGMENT UNTIL THE DATA COME IN

I wonder if this article by Austan Goolsbee was written before or after we found out that maybe 50% of all sub-prime loans went to people who could have qualified for prime?

What more have we found out about those lenders who 'targeted' the elderly, sucking the equity out of their home, with loans that "required" refi's every x years (and subjected people to pre-payment penalties)?

There is more ...

I'm trying, as best as possible, to withhold judgment until the data is in.

Sadly, I doubt it is coming.

Innovation is grand. "Suckering people" is never laudatory, even in the name of innovation.

Any brokered, relatively illiquid market is a prime candidate for abuse, true or false?

The Case of the Omniscient Regulator

Exception noted:

I see little hope of creating any kind of "early warning" system, if by that Mike means better forecasting. Crises like the current one are inherently unpredictable. If they were predictable, hedge funds and other money managers would not lose so much money during them.
-Greg Mankiw

"Inherently"? I don't think so, completely, even if it means "forecasting", to a degree.

The tools to manage risk are all in plain sight. All that one needed to do, perhaps, is to have looked at the growth charts, for CDS and for RMBS issuance in the asset-backed markets. When you view exponential growth, you worry aloud, quickly and actively.

A glance at a chart does not involve some complex understanding that goes beyond the comprehension of savvy market participants. What's more, those participants weigh a different set of concerns, most commonly, see a different utility in the outcomes. (Put another way, Greenspan was arguably wrong to have let himself get swatted with this argument, by Wall Street, when he caused them some pain by issuing the stupendous phrase that defined an era, "irrational exuberance".)

Indeed, if the 'shocked disbelief' of the current period has instructed anything, it is that an unencumbered embrace of self-regulating, all-seeing "markets" is gravely misplaced. Even on practical grounds, it may have been far less costly to the general welfare to have tried and failed than to have done nothing at all.

It helps to be particular, as well.

The key problems of "systemic risk" to the financial system, which one could argue center on AIG and Lehman, so far, both involved many risks that were certainly knowable a priori. I don't' think there was much "inevitable" about their failures.

The key problems of "economic risk", like the loading on of debt, the decline in national savings and a structural trade deficit, are problems that can be dealt with "systematically", by policy choices.

HAVING THE SAME DEBATE, OVER AND OVER AGAIN, DESPITE THE EVIDENCE

In another context, Greg argued:

But I continue to believe that there are other choices.
Following that thought, perhaps it is past time to get past old dichotomies and argue, instead, how best to formulate a set of better regulators and regulations.